

Norwegian *riktignok* and Hungarian *jóllehet*:

A contrastive pragmatic analysis of two concessive connectives

1 Introduction

1.1 Types of concessives

It may be in order to say a few words initially about the linguistic term 'concessive' and its relationship to the (object-language) English noun *concession* and the verb *concede* (i.e. "admit", "acknowledge", "allow", "accept", "grant", etc.). Unlike the corresponding noun and verb, the adjective *concessive* and the adverb *concessively* are seldom found in discourse where they are not used metalinguistically, as a linguist's technical terms, and the **noun** *concessive* is a strictly linguistic term denoting any function word that has a meaning roughly similar to anything properly defined as a concessive subordinator (*although*, *albeit*, (adversative) *while*, *whereas*), concessive coordinator ((*al*)*though*, *but*), concessive adverbial item (*nevertheless*, *nonetheless*, *all the same*, *even so*, *still*, *yet*, *after all*), concessive preposition (*in spite of*, *despite*, *notwithstanding*), or concessive parenthetical adverbial expression ((*it's*) *true*, *true enough*, *sure enough*, *to be sure*, *admittedly*). The abstract noun *concessivity* is also, of course, strictly confined to metalinguistic discourse.

Two propositions **p** and **q** are in a concessive relation to one another, if **q** is true in a context where **p** is also true, although the truth of **p** would (stereo)typically cause the communicator, the addressee, some specific third person, or people in general to believe that **q** would be false. Because **p** and **q** would not both be true in the most commonplace of contexts, the speaker/writer may find it pertinent to metarepresent the thought that a true **p** does not affect the truth conditions of **q**. We will henceforth refer to **p** as the 'concession' in a concessive relation, and we will refer to **q** as the 'counter-expectation'—for convenience, as our usage does not imply that the assertion of the truth of **q** in a concessive relation will always contradict the speaker's expectation, or contradict a metarepresented expectation that the communicator attributes to the interlocutor or to a third person.

The concession segment in a concessive relation between **p** and **q** is functionally subordinate to the complementary counter-expectation segment. Pragmatically, the truth of **q** overrides, or plays down, the relevance of a true **p**, which is generally to be construed as the immediate context in which the utterance expressing **q** should be processed. This subordination is also reflected structurally in many, and maybe most languages. The counter-expectation **q** is expressed in a main clause, and the concession is frequently in an embedded clause, a so-called concessive clause, which is an adverbial adjunct at the matrix clause level of syntactic analysis. But it is also quite common for both concession and counter-expectation to be expressed in two juxtaposed matrix clauses, in a conjunction of clauses, or in what may be analysed as contrastive coordinate constituents of a single matrix clause. The latter option is illustrated in (1), where *though* connects two predicates, both complements of the copula. There is only a subtle difference in pragmatically derived meaning, if any at all, between (1a) and the conjunction of (1b), where *though* is replaced by *but*, the most unmarked of the concessive coordinating connectives in English.

- (1) a His handwriting is childish, *though* quite distinctive.
 b His handwriting is childish, *but* quite distinctive.

In (1a) and (1b) alike, it seems that the speaker admits that the referent's handwriting is childish but insists that it is nevertheless quite distinctive, which is presumably a positive quality that overrides the information derived from the first conjunct, including the implicated meaning that the person's handwriting is undeveloped, helpless. Thus the concessive connective *though* in (1a) appears to modify **q** rather than **p**.

If we negate the declarative in the first conjunct of (1a), as shown in (2), the result is less than optimally relevant, because why would a speaker want to communicate that there is a concessive contrast between the non-childish character of someone's handwriting and the distinctive character of the same individual's handwriting? It is difficult to decide what the contrast might consist in.

- (2) a #His handwriting is not childish, *though* quite distinctive.
 b His handwriting is not childish, *but* quite distinctive.

On the other hand, (2b) with *but* would be fully acceptable, because the preferred processing of an utterance of (2b), and doubtlessly the one intended by the speaker, implies that the adversative connective *but* will not be interpreted concessively at all. An utterance of (2b) will rather be understood as a correction of something the interlocutor may have said, or implied. English is one of those languages that does not lexicalize the non-truth-conditional difference between concessivity and mutual exclusion exemplified by a special lexical differentiation found in a number of languages, including German, where *aber* ("but") indicates a concessive relation between $\neg p$ and **q**, while *sondern* ("but") is used for the communication of a contrary opposition between **p** ("His handwriting is childish") and **q** ("His handwriting is quite distinctive").

If the concessive adverb *admittedly*, describing the speaker's type of illocutionary act, is added to (1a), it is possible to insert it either in the first clause, as shown in (3), or in the second clause, as shown in (4).

- (3) His handwriting is *admittedly* childish, *though* quite distinctive.
 (4) His handwriting is childish, *though admittedly* quite distinctive.

The more weighty information is then invariably in the clause where *admittedly* is not located, because *admittedly* encodes the information that the proposition of the clause that this adverb of propositional attitude takes scope over is the concession segment **p** in a concessive relation between propositions. This implies that the second conjunct contributes more to the relevance of (3) than the first conjunct does, while the first conjunct contributes more to the relevance of the stimulus in (4). Adding negation to (3) and (4) in the manner shown in (2) makes all versions in (5) and (6) equally unacceptable, because the linguistic presence of *admittedly* highlights the concessive nature of the contrast between the conjunct propositions.

- (5) a #His handwriting is *admittedly* not childish, *though* quite distinctive.
 b #His handwriting is *admittedly* not childish, *but* quite distinctive.
 (6) a #His handwriting is not childish, *though admittedly* quite distinctive.
 b #His handwriting is not childish, *but admittedly* quite distinctive.

Unlike the English concessive connective *even though*, which is always a subordinator used to introduce a concession, the closely related connective *though* is a grammatical chameleon. When placed between two conjuncts, *though* is usually a coordinator that introduces the counter-expectation part of the concessive construction, but it is a subordinator introducing the concession part of the concessive construction when it precedes the first conjunct, as in (7).

- (7) *Though* his handwriting is childish, it is quite distinctive.

Still, the grammatical function of *though* in (4) above is that of a subordinator, even though its position there is between the two clauses. The propositional attitude adverb *admittedly* inserted in the second conjunct of (4) forces the addressee to process the utterance-final clause in (4) as an afterthought concession.

Although is functionally closer to *though* than to *even though*. (8) means virtually the same as (9), but *although* is a coordinator introducing a counter-expectation in (8) and a subordinator introducing a concession in (9).

- (8) She stopped (**p**), *although* when I waved my hand to attract her attention, she turned away (**q**).
- (9) *Although* she stopped (**p**), she turned away when I waved my hand to attract her attention (**q**).

Since the connective *even though* is made up of the two words *even* and *though*, it is natural to attribute the functional difference between *even though* and *(al)though* to the presence vs. absence of *even*. *Even* is known as a focus particle, yet it is by no means true that this part of the lexical item *even though* encodes the assumption that the concessive clause it introduces is the speaker's focus of information. The focus of the utterance is generally in the matrix clause, in the counter-expectation segment of the concessive construction. Use of a focus particle like *even* stresses the fact that **q** is true under certain circumstances (represented by **p**) that might be viewed as constituting a rather unlikely context for a true **q**.

The relationship between focus markers and concession is apparent in the Ghanaian language Akan, a Kwa language belonging to the Niger-Congo phylum.¹ The particle *dze* in (10) is a focus marker whose scope is the preceding constituent. It can be glossed as "indeed", or "true enough", or "admittedly", and it can be associated with an English speaker's use of a fall-rise pitch accent on the finite verb: on the one hand Afua will never start running, on the other hand she is nevertheless someone who moves very fast.

- (10) a Afua rentu mmirika *dze*, *nanso* no ho ye ha.
 A. prog.neg.move run foc but poss skin be fast
 "Afua will, admittedly, NOT RUN, but she IS very FAST."
- b Afua *dze*, orentu mmirika, *nanso* no ho ye ha.
 A. foc she.prog.neg.move run but poss skin be fast
 "AFUA, admittedly, won't run, but she IS very FAST."

¹ We are grateful to Nana Aba Appiah Amfo and to Stephen Ackaah for helping us with the Akan data.

(11), without the focus particle *dze*, can be interpreted in exactly the same way as (10a-b), as a concessive construction in which the adversative connective *nanso* (composed of *na* = "and" and *nso* = "also") introduces the counter-expectation segment.

- (11) Afua rentu mmirika, *nanso* no ho yɛ ha.
"Afua will not run, but she is very fast."

The only communicative difference between (10) and (11) is that the concessive contrast between the descriptions of Afua in the first compared to the second conjunct is made more manifest in the former.

In contrast to the coordinating and subordinating concessive connectives considered thus far, *nevertheless* and *still*, as in (12) and (13), respectively, are neither coordinators nor subordinators but rather concessive adverbs, and such adverbs invariably modify the argumentatively more important counter-expectation **q**, indicating at the same time that the accompanying argumentatively less important concession **p** appears in the preceding utterance.

- (12) His handwriting is childish (**p**). *Nevertheless* it is quite distinctive (**q**).
(13) She stopped (**p**).
Still, when I waved my hand to attract her attention, she turned away (**q**).

1.2 "Riktignok"

The Norwegian concessive marker *riktignok* (literally: right enough) is an adverb, like *nevertheless*, but unlike the Norwegian concessive adverb *likevel* (or *allikevel*), which can sometimes be suitably glossed as "nevertheless", *riktignok* modifies the concession, not the counter-expectation member of the concessive relation. And while *likevel* is a non-truth-conditional discourse anaphor (cf. Cornish, 2003; Fretheim, 2002; Fretheim and Johansson, 2002) like English *even so* or *nevertheless*, the marker *riktignok* is not an anaphoric item. It has no referential value. Its most accurate English gloss is probably "admittedly" appearing in (3)-(6) above, and in the English translation of Akan (10). The adverb *zwar* is a fairly neat correspondent in the German language.

In the unmarked case a clause modified by *riktignok* will be followed by a clause headed by the coordinating connective *men* ("but"), occasionally *imidlertid* ("however"). When you hear *riktignok*, you will anticipate a later occurrence of *men*, though not necessarily in the next utterance. While the concession signalled by *riktignok* and the counter-expectation signalled by *men* often make up a tight coordinative construction, one also frequently finds Norwegian texts in which several sentences intervene between an occurrence of *riktignok* and a later occurrence of *men*. Thus we see that it would not be descriptively adequate to say that the concession **p** expressed by means of a clause or phrase modified by *riktignok* serves merely as a context against which the counter-expectation **q** introduced by means of *men* is to be pragmatically processed. A linguistic form modified by *riktignok* will frequently communicate non-retrievable information, and it is only when the addressee starts to process the structure introduced by *men*, possibly several utterances later, that the addressee will appreciate its role as a contextual background against which the utterance starting with *men* should be processed.

A good example of the considerable distance that there may be between a token of *riktignok* and a later token of *men* in the same discourse is seen in example (14), which is

taken from a text found in a bidirectional translation corpus called the Oslo Multilingual Corpus (OMC, <http://www.hf.uio.no/german/sprik/english/corpus.shtml>), where the Norwegian text is a translation of the French text rendered underneath. *Riktignok* is seen to correspond to the phrase *sans doute* in the French source text. The contrast here is between a social change that was being felt in Europe towards the end of the 19th century but whose impact could be assessed properly only after the 1st World War.

(14) Norwegian translation:

Situasjonen forandrer seg *riktignok* raskt frem mot århundrets avslutning. [True, the situation changes rapidly towards the end of the (19th) century.] Verken nasjonalismens utvikling, den "demokratiske" antisemittismens eksplosive fremvekst eller veksten til massepartier som det tyske sosialdemokratiet lar seg forstå hvis vi ikke ser dem som tegn på folkemassenes helt nye og uhørte integrering i de moderne statenes politikk. *Men* det er først etter første verdenskrig at vi kan vurdere dette fenomenet best. [But it is only after the First World War that we can evaluate this phenomenon in the best way.]

←

French original:

Sans doute la situation se modifie-t-elle rapidement à la fin du siècle. Ni le développement du nationalisme, ni l'explosion d'un antisémitisme "démocratique", ni la croissance de partis de masse comme la social-démocratique allemande ne sont intelligibles si l'on n'y voit les signes d'une intégration inédite des masses populaires dans la politique des États modernes. *Mais* c'est à partir de la fin de la guerre de 1914 qu'on prend le mieux la mesure du phénomène.

The long period intervening between the appearance of *riktignok/sans doute* and the appearance of *men/mais* is an elaboration of the argument commenced in the preceding sentence with the concessive modifier, so all of that belongs to the concession with which the next statement, after *men/mais*, is to be contrasted.

One interesting way of marking a concessive relation in English is seen in the indicative conditional in (15), again from the OMC, which was, appropriately, rendered in the form of a *riktignok* construction in the Norwegian translation. In our opinion the English version in (15), with *if*, is closer in meaning to the Norwegian coordinative concessive construction with *riktignok* and *men* shown here, than if the English-writing author had used a canonical concessive conditional construction with *even if*, because, unlike concessive conditionals of the *even if* type, the conditional construction in (15) entails both **p** and **q**: the girl did wear a military jacket, there is no communicated condition, not even a concessive condition, in what is formally indistinguishable from a conditional clause.²

(15) English original:

A middle-class girl with her assurance, her knowledge of the ropes, sat properly in the chair, and *if* she wore a heavy blue military jacket, under it was a flowered pink and white blouse.

→

Norwegian translation:

Det var en ung middelklassepike med selvsikkerhet og kjennskap til reglene som satt der så pent i stolen, *riktignok* gikk hun i en stor, blå militæranorakk, *men* under

² Notice that what is syntactic subordination due to the conditional construction in the English version is a 'but'-coordination of clauses in the Norwegian translation.

jakken hadde hun en småblomstret bluse i rosa og hvitt. [lit: .. , *true enough*, she wore a big, blue military anorak, *but* under the jacket she had a small-flowered blouse in pink and white.]

One rather special English syntactic construction that bears a strong functional resemblance to the Norwegian *riktignok* construction and to the fake English conditional in (15) features the modal auxiliary *may* in a left-hand conjunct and *but* in the right-hand counterpart, though the modal auxiliary should here not be taken to imply epistemic uncertainty on the part of the speaker. This construction is illustrated in (16), whose Norwegian counterpart would be something like (17). The communicator's saying literally "it may be true" in (16) implies that, whether or not **p** is true, its truth value is of no significance, because the important thing is that **q** is true, notwithstanding its apparent incompatibility with a true **p**.

(16) He *may be* a professor, but he sure is dumb.

(17) *Riktignok* er han professor, *men* han er rimelig teit for det.³
right.enough is he professor but he is reasonably tight for that

The English *may ... but* construction has been discussed by Kay (1987) and Horn (1991). Kay claims that the possibility meaning of the modal *may* is absent in a structure like (16), while Horn argues that "this epistemic component has rather been pragmatically strengthened".⁴

The use of the English modal auxiliary *may* with a concessive function, in a sentence expressing what is to be understood as an indicative statement, is exactly what we find in Hungarian, where the original meaning of the second morpheme *lehet* of concessive *jóllehet* is "may be" (see §1.3 and section 3).

Finally, an adverb with the same function as *riktignok*, but which is always sentence-initial, is *vel*, as in (18) and (19). Interestingly, the meaning of Hungarian *jól*, the first part of *jóllehet*, is also "well".⁵

(18) *Vel* er han professor, *men* han er rimelig teit for det.
well is he professor but he is reasonably tight for that
"He is a professor, *all right*, *but* he sure is dumb all the same."

(19) *Vel* er jeg vant til stive priser på leiligheter i Oslo, *men* ikke så stive.
well am I used to stiff prices on apartments in O. but not so stiff
"*Obviously*, I am used to stiff prices on apartments in Oslo, but not that stiff (prices)."

The sentence-initial stressed *vel* in (18) and (19), which is a translation loan of German *wohl* as used in correlative structures with *wohl ... aber*, is invariably followed by the connective *men* in a coordinative construction: *vel p*, *men q*. *Vel* and *men* are true correlatives here, like *either ... or*, *neither ... nor*, *both ... and* and French *ni ... ni* and *et ... et*. The cooccurrence of *riktignok* and *men* in a discourse is very frequent but by no means

³ For an account of the Norwegian concessive lexical item *for det* (for that) in example (17), see Fretheim and Vaskó, 2004.

⁴ Horn's main concern is with seemingly redundant propositions like the proposition of the second conjunct in the coordination *She may have won by a small margin, but win she did*.

⁵ So literally *jóllehet* seems to be glossable as "it may well be that ..", where what looks like a weakening of the speaker's epistemic commitment is only apparent, just as in English (16).

mandatory, and it will be demonstrated in §2.2 that tokens of *riktignok* in the absence of a following *men* are especially interesting from a pragmatic point of view.

1.3 "Jóllehet"

Jóllehet is, in our opinion, the Hungarian connective that corresponds most directly to Norwegian *riktignok*. It is morphologically composed of *jól* and *lehet*, meaning "well" and "may be", respectively. Though the word appears to be an epistemic downtoner with the meaning "it may well be" (see footnote 5), a clause modified by *jóllehet* is indicative by virtue of its encoded meaning and the speaker's propositional attitude is by no means epistemically weakened. There is a conspicuous resemblance, therefore, between Hungarian sentence constructions with *jóllehet* and the English *may ... but* construction exemplified in (16) above.

Jóllehet modifies the concession part of a concessive relation between two propositions **p** and **q**, very frequently in such a way that *jóllehet* is in the first of two conjoined clauses, while the Hungarian adversative connective *de* ("but") or the concessive adverb *mégis* ("still", "yet", "nevertheless"), whose negative counterpart is *mégsem*, appears in the second conjunct. And *de* and *mégis/mégsem* can even co-occur in the counter-expectation part of the concessive relation, as seen in (20).

- (20) *Jóllehet drágák voltak a jegyek, de mégis tele volt a terem.*
well.maybe expensive.pl were the tickets but still full was the hall
"True, the tickets were expensive, but still the hall was full."

It is also possible for a Hungarian speaker to start her utterance with a declarative and then add a clause modified by *jóllehet*, which indicates that the explicature of the preceding declarative is felt by the speaker to contradict someone's expectations. Uttering (21), the speaker first states that the concert hall was full, then adds that the tickets were expensive, and the communicative contribution of *jóllehet* is to indicate that the hall was filled up in spite of the expensive tickets.

- (21) *Tele volt a terem, jóllehet drágák voltak a jegyek.*
full was the hall well.maybe expensive.pl were the tickets
"The hall was full ... the tickets, admittedly, were expensive (but still ...)"

The most important and most accessible pragmatic implication of an utterance like (21) with an afterthought clause modified by *jóllehet* is probably that the tickets were nevertheless worth the price, notwithstanding the cost.⁶ Thus the concessive relation seems to be between an explicit concession referring to a state of affairs evaluated as negative, and possibly unfortunate, and an implicitly conveyed subjective evaluation. The communicated assumption is that the cultural event referred to here was so great, and possibly rare, that its positive effect on the audience outweighs each ticket holder's expenditure. To repeat, (21) communicates more than that the show was sold out in spite of the expensive tickets, it also communicates the speaker's subjective feeling that the quality of the show justified the rather stiff price of the tickets.

It appears that postposed clauses with *jóllehet* and without a subsequent 'but'-clause are more natural, and therefore rather more frequent, than corresponding Norwegian

⁶ By contrast, an English concessive subordinator like *even though* in *The hall was full, even though the tickets were expensive* does not (necessarily) communicate an evaluation of the musical event.

clauses modified by *riktignok* which are not followed by a correlative *men* ("but"). The latter, as will be shown in §2.2, may give the hearer an impression of incompleteness due to the absence of a later connective *men* and an explicitly conveyed counter-expectation segment.

Hungarian *de* ("but") cannot introduce a clause modified by *jóllehet*.⁷ Nor can *jóllehet* and *mégis* co-occur in a single clause. While (22) is an acceptable conjunction of clauses, (23) and (24) are not, because in the latter two structures, a concession marker (*jóllehet*) and a counter-expectation marker (*de* or *mégis*) are put in the same conjunct.

- (22) Tele volt a terem, *de* drágák voltak a jegyek.
 "The hall was full, *but* the tickets were expensive."
 (23) ??Tele volt a terem, *de jóllehet* drágák voltak a jegyek.
 ??"The hall was full, *but admittedly* the tickets were expensive."
 (24) ??Tele volt a terem, *mégis jóllehet/jóllehet mégis* drágák voltak a jegyek.
 ??"The hall was full, *even so* the tickets were *admittedly* expensive."

De and *mégis* modify **q**, and *jóllehet* modifies **p**. They cannot appear in the same clause, because the facts represented by **p** and by **q** pull in opposite argumentative directions.

The marked word order of the counter-expectation clause in (25) boosts the significance of the referent's childish handwriting more than the unmarked word order in (26) does.

- (25) Gyerekes a kézírása (**q**), *jóllehet* teljesen olvasható (**p**).
 childish the handwriting
 "His handwriting is childish (**q**), *albeit* fully legible (**p**)."
 (lit: Childish, his handwriting is ...)
 (26) A kézírása gyerekes (**q**), *jóllehet* teljesen olvasható (**p**).
 "His handwriting is childish (**q**), *albeit* fully legible (**p**)."

A Hungarian sentence construction with *jóllehet* cannot always be translated into English by means of a construction with an embedded concessive clause. A similar constraint applies to the use of Norwegian *riktignok*. In the Hungarian sentence coordination of (27), which is an exact grammatical and semantic counterpart of Norwegian (28), one understands the contrast to obtain between promising to lend someone money and promising to lend the person **that much** money. An utterance of the English concessive construction "Although I promised to lend him money, he wants one million kroner" would probably sound pretty confused in most contexts, but to the extent that it is interpretable, it certainly does not mean the same as (27) and (28).

- (27) *Jóllehet* megígértem neki, hogy adok kölcsön, *de* 1 millió koronát kér!
 "I promised to lend him money, *it's true*, *but* he wants one million kroner!"
 (28) *Riktignok* har jeg lovt at han skulle få låne penger av meg, *men* han vil ha 1 million kroner!
 "I promised to lend him money, *it's true*, *but* he wants one million kroner!"

⁷ A similar clash results from the English combination of *but* and *admittedly*, and the Norwegian combination of *men* and *riktignok*, in a single clause.

Jóllehet and *riktignok* constructions are not just another way of saying what can be said equally well by means of a main clause and an embedded concessive clause of the 'although' type (see section 2).

The presence of the coordinating connective *de* in Hungarian syntactic structures like (20) and (27) shows that *jóllehet* in the first conjunct cannot be a subordinating connective there. However, there is no coordination of clauses in (29), so we can conclude that *jóllehet* in (29) does serve the function of a subordinator with the meaning of English (*even*) *though*, comparable to the conclusion that can be drawn from an examination of the distributional pattern of the English concessive *though*.

- (29) *Jóllehet* öt évig tanult oroszul as iskolában, nem beszél egy szót sem.
 "Even though he studied Russian at school for five years, he can't speak a word."

There is no corresponding use of Norwegian *riktignok*; the use of *jóllehet* exemplified in (29), compared to structures of the type *jóllehet p, de (mégis) q* suggests that the word may enjoy a double grammatical category membership. It can be an adverb but also a subordinating connective.

Another construction type with *jóllehet* that lacks a Norwegian counterpart with *riktignok* is seen in (30), where the segment modified by *jóllehet* is not a clause but a single constituent, while the conjunct following *de* is a full clause.

- (30) *Jóllehet* homályosan, *de* azért (*mégis*) elmesélte az egész történetet.
 well.maybe vaguely but for.that (still) told.me the whole story.acc
 "True, (it was done) vaguely, but he still told me the whole story."

The same kind of non-clausal first conjunct modified by *jóllehet* is seen in (31), a Hungarian way of expressing something very similar to English (16) or Norwegian (17).

- (31) *Jóllehet* professzor, *de* azért (*mégis*) meglehetősen bugyuta.
 well.maybe professor but for.that (still) fairly dumb
 "True, (he's a) professor, but all the same he is fairly dumb."

Functionally, however, (30) and (31) are not different from other Hungarian coordinative structures with *jóllehet* in the first (clausal) conjunct and *de* in the next one: the information in the second conjunct, introduced by *de/mégis*, carries more weight than the information in the first conjunct.

2 The semantics of "riktignok"

2.1 The co-occurrence of "riktignok" and "men"

What all Norwegian concessive relations expressed by means of *riktignok* ... *men* ("admittedly ... but") have in common is that the information in the counter-expectation part outweighs the information in the concession part modified by *riktignok*. What we are referring to as two concessively related propositions **p** and **q** have what Anscombe and Ducrot (1983) call 'opposite argumentative orientations' (see Iten, 2000, for a critical appraisal); the two propositions represent an argument and a counter-argument, respectively. One sub-case of that kind of situation is where the concession with its propositional content **p** represents what the communicator regards as good news, while the counter-balancing propositional content **q** represents bad news, or *vice versa*. This

asymmetric relation of strength between **p** and **q** is also found in discourses where **q** entails but is not entailed by **p**, as when you say that some commodity *x* is admittedly expensive but some other commodity is even more expensive than *x*. Or, the proposition of the second conjunct can be a denial of a proposition **q** that entails but is not entailed by **p** in the first conjunct. If we rank **p** and **q** on a context-dependent scale (of informativeness, or desirability, for instance), then **q** outranks **p** but as far as the speaker is concerned, **p** may be the strongest **true** proposition on the scale, so that **p** is in a concessive relation to $\neg\mathbf{q}$ rather than to a positive proposition **q** that entails **p**.

The tendency for *riktignok* to appear in the company of *men* in Norwegian discourse is so strong that the absence of *men* in (33) below makes that sequence of sentences incoherent, as opposed to (32) where the two markers co-occur. *Riktignok* has a forward-pointing function. It points towards the more weighty part **q** of the concessive relation between **p** and **q**. Hearing *riktignok*, the addressee will expect the connective *men* to follow within a few seconds—though there are interesting exceptions (cf. §2.2).

(32) *Riktignok* kan ikke Martinsen noe tyrkisk (**p**). *Men* det er ikke noe stort problem (**q**).
 "Certainly/To be sure, M. doesn't know any Turkish. But that's no major problem."

(33) *Riktignok* kan ikke Martinsen noe tyrkisk (**p**). #Det er ikke noe stort problem (**q**).
 "Certainly/To be sure, M. doesn't know any Turkish. #That's no major problem."

What is conveyed in (32), via an implicature, is that Martinsen has other relevant personal qualities that make up for his lack of familiarity with Turkish. Proficiency in Turkish is apparently a desideratum in this case, but it is not essential. Even before the addressee has heard the second utterance in (32), the occurrence of *riktignok* in the first utterance prepares him for a subsequent statement which implies that knowledge of Turkish is not a *sine qua non* for Martinsen. (33) opens with the same procedural indicator *riktignok*, but it fails to follow up the concession by indicating overtly what part of the discourse is meant to be processed as being concessively related to the statement that Martinsen does not know Turkish. The absence of an overt link between the declaratives of (33) is likely to confuse the addressee.

Example (34), found in the OMC, is an interesting illustration of concessive constructions embedded within other concessive constructions. This is an English source text, which was translated into Norwegian by someone who could frankly have done a better job.

(34) English original:

Inside, things are even more daunting.

There are doors and windows, *true*, and walls, and the furnace works. [*good!*]

There's a picture window in the living room, [*good!*]
though the view is of a large expanse of rippling mud. [*bad!*]

The toilet actually flushes, [*good!*]
though it has a yellowish-brown ring around the inside of the bowl and several floating cigarette butts; and reddish warmish water comes from the hot-water tap when I turn it on. [*bad!*]

But the floors are not polished wood or even linoleum. They're made of wide, rough boards with cracks in between, grey with plaster dust and scattered with white speckles, like bird droppings. [*bad!*]

→

Norwegian translation:

Innenfor er det enda mer foruroligende.

Det er dører og vinduer, *riktignok*, og vegger, og ovnen virker. [*good!*]

Det er panoramavindu i stuen, [*good!*]

skjønt med utsikt utover et bølgende leirlandskap. [*bad!*]

Vannklossettet virker faktisk, [*good!*]

men det er en gulbrun ring på innsiden av toalettskålen der det skvalper en del sigarettstumper, og det kommer røddlig lunkent vann ut av varmtvannskranen når jeg skrur på den. [*bad!*]

Gulvene er ikke polerte tregulv, ikke av linoleum engang. De er av brede, ru bord med sprekker imellom, grå av murpuss og med hvite flekker som ligner fugleskitt. [*bad!*]

We feel that the parenthetically inserted concessive *true* in the second sentence of the English source text is meant by the author to be connected with the counter-expectation indicator *but* (with a capital B, because it opens a new period) appearing several sentences down. In the intervening area there are two antithetic concessive relations, both marked by the connective *though* in the counter-expectation segment. These are communicatively subordinate to the concessive relation established by means of the two textually separated markers *true* and *but*.

The rhetorical beauty of the original English text presented in (34) was not captured adequately by the translator, who simply deleted the final occurrence of *but* (with a capital B) in the original and inserted *men* ("but") in the preceding period instead. The result is that, in processing the sentence that conveys the disastrous information about the floors in the house, the reader will not be able to relate the counter-expectation proposition to the concessive propositions modified by *riktignok*, which appeared much earlier in the text. The italicized *riktignok* in the Norwegian version has no linguistic correlate in a much later sentence expressing the corresponding counter-expectation proposition. In the English original the major concessive relation is marked by the underlined correlatives *true* and *but*. In order to make the individual concessive relations more visible, we decided to break the lines in (34) after each argument and to add an extra line-shift to indicate transition to a new concessive pair consisting of argument and counter-argument. The negative things consistently outweigh the positive concessions,⁸ as one can predict even after reading the first statement, "Inside, things are even more daunting", which is not a member of any of the concessive discourse relations in (34), but which prepares the reader for some lugubrious descriptions to appear in the course of the next lines.

In sum, the translation in (34) would have been improved if the translator had adhered to the original in terms of syntactic organization. The concessive connective *skjønt* is the closest Norwegian counterpart of English *though*, and it could profitably have been

⁸ How can anything be more important than the fact that the house has windows and doors and walls? Well, that first concession is obviously ironic, metarepresenting the real estate agent's praise.

used twice in the translation, glossing both occurrences of *though*. Moreover the use of the final *but* in the original is a cohesive element which increases the relevance of the discourse of (34), so its Norwegian correspondent *men* should have been maintained.

Our next illustration is a Norwegian fictional source text (from the OMC) translated into English and German. Sometimes the 'counter-expectation' statement anticipated by the presence of *riktignok*, or by an English correspondent like *true enough*, or one of the German concessive adverbs *zwar* or *allerdings*, is not introduced by means of a connective that encodes a concessive contrast between two states of affairs, but the counter-expectation part is nevertheless introduced in an explicit manner. In (35), after a presentation of a thought attributed to Immanuel Kant and several lines of comment on the validity of his position, the writer's counter-argument is signalled by the English phrase *it's just that*, corresponding to Norwegian *bare* ("just", "only") in the source text, and to German *nur* ("just", "only") in the German translation.⁹

(35) English translation:

True enough, that paragon among thinkers, Immanuel Kant, asserts that our actions ought to be representative, that they must have a validity which makes them into a general law and a rule of conduct for others. As an abstract thinker he is undoubtedly correct. That's the way it must be in the ideal world, where his categorical imperative and his Ding an sich are to be found. *It's just that* he ignores the fact that we are human beings of flesh and blood, ...

←

Norwegian original:

Mestertenkeren Immanuel Kant hevder *riktignok* at våre handlinger bør være representative, at de må ha en gyldighet som gjør dem til allmenn lov og til rettesnor for andre. Som abstrakt tenker har han utvilsomt rett. Sånn må det være i den ideale verden, der hans kategoriske imperativ og hans "Ding an sich" befinner seg. Han ser *bare* bort fra at vi er mennesker av kjøtt og blod, ...

→

German translation:

Immanuel Kant behauptet *zwar*, daß unsere Taten repräsentativ sein sollten, daß sie eine Gültigkeit haben müssen, die sie zum allgemeinen Gesetz und zur Richtschnur für andere macht. Als abstrakter Denker hat er zweifellos recht. *Nur* übersieht er die Tatsache, daß wir Menschen aus Fleisch und Blut sind, ...

There is an irony in the use of the underlined items *it's just that*, *bare*, and *nur* in (35). The writer's irony is made mutually manifest by the presence of the earlier items *true enough*, *riktignok*, and *zwar*, respectively, which mark the concession part in the rhetorical structure of these text fragments. As the concession is only meant to serve as a context against which the later, weightier argument is to be understood, the reader will not associate *it's just that*, *bare* and *nur* with an argument of slight importance. On the contrary, the readers have been overtly prepared for an argument that overrules the thoughts attributed to Kant in the earlier structures modified by the concessive markers *true enough*, *riktignok* and *zwar*. They will therefore go for an irony interpretation of the italicized attitudinal markers in the respective final sentences in (35), markers that might otherwise give us the impression that their contribution to relevance is to downplay the importance of the contextual implications of the writer's point that we are human beings of flesh and blood.

⁹ *Nur* has appropriately received the sentence-initial position indicative of its wide, sentential scope. The German translation dispenses with the next-to-final period of the source text, an understandable decision.

Example (36) below is also from the OMC. It is another excerpt from a Norwegian novel translated into English and German. What is of special interest here is the incredible miss of the person responsible for the German translation, who oversaw the fact that Dina was NOT (Norwegian *ikke*) impressed. The faulty affirmative translation *Dina was besonders beeindruckt* ("Dina was particularly impressed") caused the translator to insert the concessive adverb *zwar*, corresponding to Norwegian *riktignok*, in an attempt to restore relevance in the wake of the lost negation operator in the first line. Adding *zwar* was apparently felt to be a necessary move, but the presence of that German concessive marker is vindicated only by the translator's failure to translate the first line correctly. However, a concessive like *riktignok* (or for that matter German *zwar*) would have been justified if it had occurred in the very first sentence of the Norwegian text in (36), so that its scope would be understood to extend through all the negative statements right down to the appearance of the counter-expectation marker *men* ("but") introducing the following counter-argument. This is indicated by the bracketed bold-faced token of *riktignok* that we have added, for the sake of the argument, in the first line of the Norwegian text.

(36) English translation:

Dina did *not* seem particularly impressed that they were staying at an estate that had housed chief magistrates and members of the Royal Council and that, at its height of prosperity, had been as large as two or three parishes combined. She uttered *no* polite exclamations about the splendid rooms. Did *not* remark on the manor house itself, which was two stories high and sixty-eight feet long. *But* she stopped each time they passed the remarkable old bautas at the entrance to the main courtyard.

←

Norwegian original:

Dina viste seg [**riktignok**] *ikke* særlig imponert over at de gjestet en gård som hadde huset både sorenskriver og justisråd, og som i sine velmaktsdager tilsvarte 2-3 prestegjeld. Hun kom *ikke* med høflige utbrudd om de staselige stuene. Bemerket *ikke* hovedbygningen, i to etasjer og 34 alen lang. *Men* hun ble stående hver gang de skulle passere de merkelige bautasteinene ved innkjørselen til hovedgården.

→

German translation:

Dina **war besonders beeindruckt davon**, daß sie einen Hof besuchten, der Amtsrichter und Justizräte beherbergt hatte und der in seinen besten Tagen so groß wie zwei bis drei Kirchspiele gewesen war. Sie brach **zwar nicht** in höfliches Entzücken über die prächtigen Wohnräume aus. Bemerkte *nicht* das Hauptgebäude mit seinen zwei Etagen und einer Länge von vierunddreißig Ellen. *Aber* sie blieb jedesmal, wenn sie durch die Einfahrt gingen, bei den seltsamen Bautasteinen stehen.

All the negative statements prior to the connective *men* in the Norwegian source text are concessions with the same argumentative orientation. First the reader is given a general conclusion about Dina's attitude to the estate, and then this conclusion is justified by two exemplifications, or elaborations. In the German version, however, a new argument starts in the negative statement modified by *zwar*, contrasting with the information in the sentence with the erroneous polarity. The German translator must have added *zwar* in order not to give the reader the impression that the second period continues the same argument as in the first period, because the change of polarity between the first line and the middle of the third line of the German text in (36) would preclude that kind of interpretation. However, as the omission of the negation in the first line was due to an oversight, the later insertion of *zwar* was an ad hoc remedy motivated by the earlier wrong translation.

2.2 "Riktignok" p - but where is q?

How important is the linguistic presence of a sentence expressing a counter-expectation proposition **q** when a communicator has produced a token of *riktignok*? The translator's omission of a later connective *men* ("but") in front of the noun *gulvene* in (34) was unfortunate. In the present section, however, we are going to consider some fully coherent Norwegian discourses in which there is no overt counter-expectation segment in the wake of an occurrence of *riktignok*.

The Norwegian source text cited below in (37), from the OMC, exemplifies free indirect speech (hence the consistent use of the subjunctive mood in the German translation). There had previously been a reference to a dog that had to endure the sound of a cello practised on by an amateur musician, and in (37) the plight of that dog is being compared to a similar situation involving a different dog living under the same roof as a practicing amateur violinist. The counter-expectation part of the communicated concessive relation in (37) contains two connectives, *men likevel* ("but still"), and nothing more, so the narrator's proposition that is supposed to fill the three dots—which is an implicature¹⁰ rather than an explicature—must be recovered through pragmatic inference based on information that appeared in the preceding discourse. The English translation of *riktignok* as *of course* underscores the narrator's awareness that there is a difference between the two cases, and that it may be one of quality. Being forced to listening to a cello day out and day in might be even more of a challenge. The question posed is to what extent the story about the dog that grew accustomed to the violin applies also to the current case where the dog is stuck with a cellist. The concession with *riktignok* and the corresponding English, German and French items stresses the fact that the two situations described are not absolutely identical, though the connectives in the final interrupted structure seem to suggest that they are after all similar enough for a comparison to be valid.

(37) English translation:

In fact, someone he knew owned a dog that slowly but surely had become accustomed to music. For the first month, the animal only howled. It was terrible. But gradually the dog became calmer. In the end, it would just lie down and go to sleep. *Of course*, that had been violin music. *But still* ...

←

Norwegian original:

Ja, en han kjente hadde en hund som også sakte, men sikkert måtte venns til musikk. Første måneden ulte den bare. Alt var forskrekkelig. Men etter hvert vennet den seg til det. Til sist la den seg rolig til å sove. Ja, det hadde vært spilt fiolin, *riktignok*. *Men likevel* ... (lit: Yes, it had been played violin, *true enough*. *But still* ...)

→

German translation:

Ja, ein Bekannter von ihm habe ein Hund gehabt, der auch langsam, aber sicher habe an die Musik gewöhnt werden müssen. Im ersten Monat habe er nur gejault. Es sei schrecklich gewesen. Aber allmählich habe er sich daran gewöhnt. Zuletzt habe er

¹⁰ An explicature is a 'hybrid' truth-evaluable mental representation to which two cognitively quite different conceptual inputs have contributed, namely, a linguistically encoded logical form and context-dependent inference. Implicatures, on the other hand, do not build on a logical form; they arise purely on the basis of inference. As the utterance *But still* ... does not encode a logical form, the output of the extra-linguistic inferential process that leads to the addressee's identification of a proposition that fits the empty 'counter-expectation' slot should be classified as an implicature.

sich ruhig hingelegt und geschlafen. Nun ja, es habe sich um Violinspiel gehandelt.
Aber trotzdem ...

→

French translation:

Oui, quelqu'un qu'il connaissait avait un chien qu'il avait fallu habituer à la musique. Le premier mois, il ne faisait que hurler. Mais petit à petit, il s'y était habitué. A la fin, il se couchait tranquillement pour dormir. Ah, c'était du violon qu'on jouait, *c'est vrai. Mais quand même ...*

How are we supposed to complement, in our minds, the interrupted second conjuncts *but still*, *men likevel*, *aber trotzdem* or *quand même* in (37)? Our mental tracking of the proposition that could have been expressed overtly as complements of those concessive connectives is heavily constrained by two things: (i) the concessive contrast indicated on the one hand by the Norwegian concessive adverb *riktignok* and its correspondents in the English, German and French target texts and on the other hand by the Norwegian counter-expectation connectives *men likevel* and their correspondents in the three target texts, and (ii) bits of information made accessible in the course of the lines preceding the concessive construction, which contrasts with the narrator's admitting that the dog that stopped howling was exposed to sounds from a violin, not a cello.

The theoretical problems posed by fragmentary utterances like English *but still*, Norwegian *men likevel*, German *aber trotzdem*, and French *quand même* in (37) have been discussed by Blakemore (2002). She emphasizes that there is an important difference between a fragmentary utterance like, say, *Coffee* and a fragmentary utterance like *But still*, or *Nevertheless*. The former encodes a concept; the latter two encode a procedure. More specifically, the latter tell the addressee to view two communicated propositions as being concessively related, that is, contrasted but mutually consistent. One of the two concessively related propositions, **p**, may be expressed in a Norwegian utterance containing *riktignok*, and the other one, **q**, could have been expressed in the complement of *men likevel* and its correspondents. However, that position is linguistically empty, so the addressee must identify the 'counter-expectation' proposition **q** exclusively through relevance-driven inference.

The next-to-final utterance in (37), which contains the first member of the concessive relation, makes it rather easy for the reader to activate the implicature—true or false, yet apparently true for this narrator—that, other things being equal, it is relatively speaking worse for a dog to have to listen to an amateur musician playing the cello. This implicature is an assumption that is in an appropriately concessive relation to a communicated hope, or expectation that the 'cello dog' will by and by be reconciled with the noises emitted from the cello, a hope which is supported by the parallel story about the dog that learned how to cope with the sounds from a violin. One might therefore be tempted to conclude that what constitutes the concession **p** is really an implicated meaning, something like "living with a practising cello player means tougher odds for a dog than living with a fiddler", derived on the basis of what was said in the next-to-final utterance.

There is, however, no unique answer to the question how a reader of (37) should identify either **p** or the linguistically zero proposition **q** of the concessive relation in (37) in order to make the stimulus optimally relevant to him. At the most accessible surface level, **p** is the explicature of the next-to-final utterance, and **q** might be something like "The narrated dog-and-violin story can be compared to the current dog-and-cello case (because the two situations are sufficiently similar)". But it would also be legitimate to argue, in line with what we said above, that the communicated concessive relation is between the implicature mentioned in the previous paragraph and the implicated counter-expectation

that the cello dog may (nevertheless) grow accustomed to the sound of the instrument after a while, so that he will not develop a trauma. The latter interpretation requires more processing effort for the reader but gives more cognitive effects in return (Sperber and Wilson, 1995).

Now, as there is no unique proposition that can be said to be the one to fill the empty proposition after *Men likevel .../But still ...*, a reader of (37) could conceivably access the inference that even listening to someone playing the fiddle may be hard on a dog; in other words, the stimulus could be processed as if the final part of (37) read as follows: "Of course, that had been violin music, *but still, even being forced to listening to violin music may be traumatic for a dog*". That, however, is an interpretation that leads to a deadlock; we can conclude that it is positively wrong, because it takes no notice of the cello dog and ignores the contextual information that the violin dog gradually managed to overcome its physical and psychological pain—which suggests that there may (still) be hope for the cello dog as well.

Sometimes there is no linguistic trace of a counter-expectation proposition *q* following a concession modified by *riktignok*, not even in the form of an interrupted second conjunct meaning "but still". In the OMC, some of those occurrences of *riktignok* that are not matched with a later occurrence of *men* appear in syntactic structures of the following sort:

- | | | | |
|------|--|---|---|
| (38) | <i>Riktignok</i> hender det.
right.enough happens it
"True, it happens." | / | Det hender, <i>riktignok</i> .
it happens right.enough
"It happens, <i>true enough</i> ." |
|------|--|---|---|

What you will infer immediately upon being told (38) is that the abstract-entity pronoun *det* ("it") in this truth-conditionally highly underdetermined sentence structure represents the exceptional case, so we can infer that "it happens very rarely".

Sometimes a concession indicated by *riktignok* is placed in parenthesis by an author, obviously an iconic way of indicating that the more important message can be derived on the basis of the information given prior to what is put in parenthesis, which is to be construed as being in a concessive relation to the proposition inside the parenthesis. The Norwegian and English OMC texts in (39) are translations of the German text. It is only in the two translations that the information in parenthesis is ostensibly presented to the reader as a concession *stricto sensu*. However, the Norwegian main clause with *riktignok* corresponds to the English concessive clause with the connective *even though*, and these concessives are both acceptable translational correspondents of German *auch wenn* ("also when").

(39) German original:

Alle hören wir jetzt dieses Kinderschreien und halten den Atem an (*auch wenn* wir am nächsten Morgen so tun werden, als sei nichts gewesen).

→

English translation:

And now we all hear the child's cries and hold our breath (*even though* in the morning we act as if nothing had happened).

→

Norwegian translation:

Nu lytter vi alle til barneskrikene og holder pusten (i morgen tidlig kommer vi *riktignok* til å late som ingenting).

One important difference between the English and the Norwegian text in (39) is that, while the English version is a normal concessive construction in which the main clause precedes the concessive clause, there is a structural break between the first and the second clause in the Norwegian version. While the use of German *auch wenn* ("also when") shows that the following information is to be linked to what precedes the parenthesis, and while English *even though* points backwards to the main clause with which that concessive clause is constructed, the Norwegian clause modified by *riktignok* is felt to be more of an afterthought which is syntactically, but not discourse-structurally, unrelated to what precedes it. *Riktignok* generally points ahead in the discourse, not backwards, even when there is no later overt *men* to indicate the beginning of a counter-argument. The concessive adverb points to an unarticulated second conjunct, as it were, the content of which can be inferred on the basis of discourse-activated information. (40) is rather similar to (32), but there is no use of *men*, and *riktignok*, introducing the speaker's concession, now appears in the second of the two juxtaposed sentences.

- (40) Martinsen kan ikke noe tyrkisk. *Riktignok* er ikke det noe stort problem (p). ...
 "Martinsen doesn't know any Turkish. *Admittedly*, that is no major problem. ..."

The most accessible interpretation of (40) is that having no knowledge of Turkish is, after all, a disadvantage for Martinsen. Therefore an utterance of (40) seems to be relevant just in case the speaker stresses the adjective *stort* ("big", "major") and de-stresses the head noun *problem*. Depending on context, one could infer, hearing (40), that, while Martinsen's lack of language proficiency is not a tremendous problem, it does put him in an awkward or disadvantageous position, considering the job he has committed himself to, or has applied for. The presence of *riktignok* in (40) encourages the addressee to take the explicature of the preceding utterance as a starting-point for computing those contextual implications that are going to constitute the counter-expectation part of an inferentially construed concessive relation between two propositions.

The OMC discourse in which (41) appears likewise lacks a subsequent token of *men*. Here *riktignok* modifies a prepositional phrase with a nominalized predication in the prepositional object position. However, this phrase points ahead rather than backwards, and therefore the English translation *at the cost of many Norwegian civilian lives* is not one that captures every semantic aspect and every pragmatic implication of the corresponding Norwegian appendix to the preceding main clause.

- (41) Norwegian original:
 Likeledes ble det ferdigproduserte tungtvannet ødelagt, *riktignok* etter tap av mange norske sivile liv. (p)
 →
 English translation:
 Heavy water which was en route to Germany was also destroyed, at the cost of many Norwegian civilian lives.

Riktignok forces the reader of (41) to derive by pragmatic inference a counter-expectation which was not given linguistic expression in (41). Its presence should be sufficient to trigger the reader's search for the unexpressed counter-expectation member (q) of the concessive relation signalled by *riktignok*, which, *nota bene*, is not to be equated with the proposition of the preceding utterance. Since loss of a number of lives is a disaster no matter what context might be envisaged, what may be felt to 'compensate for' that disaster in the 2nd World War context of (41) must be something beneficial and significant for the

Norwegian population at large, and for the allied military forces. One highly accessible candidate for a counter-argument here would be the inferred assumption that the heavy water sabotage of the Norwegian resistance group in the county of Telemark, that is, their bombing of the heavy water plant at Rjukan and their later interception of the transportation of heavy water to Germany—which is what (41) refers to—was a remarkable accomplishment of utmost significance, which somehow made up for the loss of Norwegian civilian lives. Hitler's progress with the development of a nuclear bomb was seriously hampered.

The data presented in (42) shows that the linguistic appearance of *riktignok*, which is a non-truth-conditional word like any other concessive, can indirectly affect the pragmatically derived truth-conditional content of an utterance. The definite description *husleia* ("the rent") in (42a) and (42b) is a conceptually underdetermined phrase, an 'indirect anaphor' (Erk  and Gundel, 1987; Gundel, 1996; Matsui, 2000¹¹; Cornish, 2003) whose reference must be resolved via 'bridging inference', in this case activation of background assumptions about why people might decide to move from one part of a city to a different part of the same city.¹²

- (42) a Jon og Liv flytta fra By sen til Lade. Husleia var lavere.
 "Jon and Liv moved from By sen to Lade. The rent was lower."
 b Jon og Liv flytta fra By sen til Lade. Husleia var *riktignok* lavere ...
 "Jon and Liv moved from By sen to Lade. The rent was, *admittedly*, lower."

The pragmatic assumption that is required in order to make (42a) relevant is that the speaker's information about the lower rent must explain why they moved to Lade: the rent was evidently lower at Lade than at By sen, a positive factor that might even be decisive. By adding *riktignok* the speaker of (42b) changes the relevance of the utterance. (42b) could be taken in a variety of ways, but the point must always be that the hearer should consider the fact that the rent was lower (in one of those places) as something less significant than the unexpressed information in the covert counter-expectation part of the concessive relation. In one context the hearer will infer that the reason why they moved had nothing to do with the monthly rent they had to pay, and that the rent referred to in (42a) must be the rent paid at By sen, for the dwelling that they moved from. We can imagine that the house they moved to at Lade had certain attractions that they missed at By sen, some important attractions, because the rent is after all going to be higher at Lade. *Riktignok* is not a truth-conditional word, it orients the hearer's attention in the direction of something about the place they were moving to, which the speaker feels to be more important than the slightly higher rent they have to pay there. In a different context, however, the most accessible interpretation would be such that the nominal *husleia* refers to the rent at Lade, just as in (42a). Thus the rent is admittedly cheaper at Lade, but there is apparently something fundamentally wrong with the house at Lade, and one might expect the speaker to elaborate on that in the sequel.

In (44), compared to (43), there is a token of *riktignok* that appears in a prepositional phrase embedded in the direct object argument.

- (43) To liter med store og flotte b r var det vi fant.
 two litres with big and beautiful berries was demonstr we found
 "Two litres of big and beautiful berries was what we found."

¹¹ Matsui's book makes the most of data of essentially the sort presented in (42).

¹² Lade and By sen are parts of the city of Trondheim.

- (44) T o liter med *riktignok* store og flotte bær var det vi fant.
 #Two litres of admittedly big and beautiful berries was what we found."

The speaker of (43) impresses us as being quite satisfied with the catch. Why else would she describe those berries in such positive terms? (44) is identical to (43), with the exception of an added concessive *riktignok* inside the post-nominal prepositional phrase. The speaker's reservation comes out quite clearly in the utterance of (44). To be sure, the berries they picked were magnificent but due to the appearance of *riktignok* in the complex direct object phrase we are made to understand that the speaker is not entirely happy with the situation. The most accessible unexpressed assumption is probably that, in spite of the great size and color and taste of the berries, there were too few of them. Thus (44) is likely to be interpreted as if the speaker had said (45), where the restricting nature of the quantified phrase may be said to force the hearer to activate the assumption that they did not find enough berries.

- (45) To liter med *riktignok* store og flotte bær var *alt* vi fant.
 "Two litres of *admittedly* big and beautiful berries was *all that we found*."

The implicature that there were too few berries is very close at hand for anyone processing (45) but the same implicature is almost as easily evoked by an utterance of (44), thanks to the occurrence of the marker *riktignok* whose scope is the conjunction of adjectival predicates *store og flotte* ("big and beautiful"). That concessive enjoins the hearer to look for an adversative counterpart of the explicit information that the berries looked great, more specifically, to activate an assumption which, unfortunately, carries more weight for the speaker than the overtly conveyed information.

The pragmatic difference between (46), where *riktignok* opens the second utterance, and (47), where *likevel* ("nevertheless", "still") occupies the position that *riktignok* has in (46), is one that native speakers of Norwegian tend to appreciate instantly.

- (46) Dressen koster 2000 kroner. *Riktignok* er den på salg.
 "The price of the suit is 2000 kroner. It is, *true enough*, on sale."

- (47) Dressen koster 2000 kroner. *Likevel* er den på salg.
 "The price of the suit is 2000 kroner. *Still*, it's on sale."

Naturally, the explicatures are the same in (46) and (47), because neither *riktignok* nor *likevel* are truth-conditional words. However, there is a communicated difference in the speaker's attitude to the price tag on the suit referred to. While the speaker of (47) finds two thousand kroner excessive for a suit that is on sale, the speaker of (46) is actually surprised to learn that the price is that low. What is said in (47) implies that the suit is so much that one would not expect it to be on sale; the second utterance expresses the counter-expectation **q** in a concessive relation. The corresponding utterance in (46) on the other hand explains why this offer turns out to be, relatively speaking, a bargain, though the sale alone is not felt to be sufficient to explain the very reasonable price. The first utterance in (46) communicates a higher-level explicature (Wilson and Sperber, 1993) of speaker surprise that the suit is not more expensive, though in the event of processing (46) you will not be able to activate that assumption until you have heard the final utterance with the concessive modifier. As in previous illustrations of the use of *riktignok* when there is no ensuing occurrence of *men*, the concessive connective encourages the hearer to draw a conclusion based on the *riktignok*-modified utterance viewed in the context provided by

the immediately preceding discourse, and in the present situation this unexpressed, implicated counter-expectation is that the price is so low that the sale alone does not answer the speaker's question why that is.

2.3 **p** and **q** can be fully compatible

We have said that there is a kind of adversative relation between **p** and **q** in concessive constructions—that **q** is true in spite of the truth of **p**—but in (48) there is surely no incompatibility between being the most expensive wine and being the tastiest wine. On the other hand there is definitely a communicated contrast here, because the first conjunct in (48) describes what is bad about the wine referred to by the proximal demonstrative, while the second conjunct describes what is good about it.

- (48) Dette er *riktignok* den dyreste av de tre vinene vi har smakt på (**p**), men det er (også) avgjort den beste (**q**).

"This is *admittedly* the most expensive of the three wines we have tasted, *but* it is (also) decidedly the best."

In the terminology of Anscombe and Ducrot (1983), the propositions of the two conjuncts in (48) have the **same** argumentative orientation, not the kind of opposite orientation that some linguists like to believe to be a requirement for appropriate use of a connective like *but*. How can we account for the fact that **q** apparently does not represent a 'counter-expectation' in (48) but rather the opposite, what we **expect** to be the case, given **p**? If you have a choice between three brands of the same kind of product and there is a considerable difference in price between the cheapest and the most expensive brand, you would expect many consumers to go for the cheapest one, except that—contrary to expectations—they might nevertheless decide to buy the most expensive brand if there is evidence that it is of a superior quality. 'Counter-expectation', as noted previously, is a term that we have been using for convenience, just to have a handy label to stick to the proposition **q** whose information outweighs the information derived from **p**. In (48) the communicated concessive relation is not between the propositions **p** and **q** but rather between paying less on the one hand and paying more but getting a better product on the other hand. That you pay less for the other two wines referred to in (48) is not explicated; it is an entailed, but at the same implicated, cognitive effect of the addressee's processing of those utterances (for an argument that certain entailments may be implicatures, see Carston, 2002: 137-141).

The lexical entry for the concessive *riktignok* must include the instruction that two propositions—representing two distinct states of affairs—are to be recovered and compared. Those two propositions must contrast in the way that **p** and **q** were seen to contrast in all our examples, but the data in (48) reveals that the concessive contrast may be between an argument for choosing the best wine and an argument for choosing a less expensive wine, the latter activated via an implicature of **p**.

Example (49) communicates that the speaker is not accustomed to prices of apartments in Oslo that are as outrageous as the price of the one referred to there. That information is obtained by the hearer in the form of an implicature derived on the basis of three sources: (a) the speaker's explicature **q** which includes a reference to the sum of two million kroner, (b) the proposition **p** of the first conjunct of (49), and (c) the procedural lexical meanings of *riktignok* and *men* (for relevance-theoretic pragmatic analyses of *but*, see Iten, 2000; Blakemore, 2000), which encourage the hearer to identify two propositions in the discourse as concession and counter-expectation, respectively.

- (49) *Riktignok* er jeg vant med stive priser på leiligheter i Oslo (**p**),
men denne her koster to millioner (**q**)!
 "To be sure, I'm accustomed to stiff prices of apartments in Oslo,
 but the price of this one is two million (kroner)."

Observe that an utterance of (49) will hardly be understood to convey that the apartment referred to is different from the average apartment advertised for sale in Oslo because it costs **less** than what the speaker had expected. That, however, would be the most accessible interpretation if *riktignok* were left out, as seen in (50).

- (50) Jeg er vant med stive priser på leiligheter i Oslo (**p**),
men denne her koster to millioner (**q**)!

An utterance of (50) can be used to inform the hearer that the apartment referred to by means of the subject phrase *denne her* ("this one") in the second conjunct is an exception, the implicated conclusion being that two million kroner is a reasonable price for that particular dwelling. This is also how one might be tempted to understand an utterance that contains a regular embedded concessive clause of the 'although' type, though most native speakers of Norwegian seem to reject (51) flatly as ungrammatical.

- (51) ??Selv om jeg er vant med stive priser på leiligheter i Oslo, så koster denne her to millioner.
 ?"Although I am accustomed to stiff prices of apartments in Oslo, the price of this one is two million (kroner)."

The difference between (49) and (51), in terms of acceptability as well as content, suggests that our identification of those propositions that are meant to be in a concessive relation to one another is less constrained when the concessive relation is signalled by the adverbial connective *riktignok* appearing in a coordinative construction, than when it is expressed by means of an embedded clause whose concessive connective is *selv om* ("although"). While an 'although' clause construction indicates that there is a concessive relation between the two propositions expressed in concessive clause and main clause, respectively, a coordinative construction with *riktignok* permits the addressee to identify one of the members in the concessive relation as an implicature, which is evoked by what is said in conjunction with accessible contextual information.

3 The semantics of "jóllehet"

There are a number of Hungarian concessive markers such as *bár*, *habár*, *noha*, *jóllehet* that can often be glossed as "though". Simonyi (1881-83) notes that *jóllehet* indicates that the proposition of the clause it appears in is presented by the communicator as true, beyond doubt, whereas *bár* and the equivalent connective *habár* (where *ha-* corresponds to English *if*) indicate some degree of epistemic uncertainty on the part of the communicator, as when a speaker of English uses a concessive conditional clause with the connective *even if*. In other words, *jóllehet* implies factuality, *bár* implies a modal qualification. This seems to be a valid observation.

One use of *though* or *although* is seen in hedging afterthoughts and halfway renunciations of what was said immediately before. The most fitting Hungarian

correspondent of *though* in (52) is *bár*, as shown in the Hungarian translation, because *bár* emphasizes the speaker's uncertainty or scepticism.

- (52) I ought to have spent more of my time studying insects *though* I don't know.

→

Hungarian: Több időt kellett volna szentelnem a rovarok tanulmányozására ...

bár nem is tudom.

though not either I.know

The Norwegian connective that matches the meaning of *bár* most exactly is *skjønt*, the Norwegian translation of *though* in the OMC correspondence of (53) below, where there is a discrepancy between what the T-person says and what he thinks. A Hungarian rendition is given in (54). *Skjønt*, *though* and *bár* (and Swedish *fast*) are all concessives that may be used to moderate or mitigate the foregoing speech act, possibly informing us that the speaker's epistemic commitment may not be exactly what the preceding utterance suggests. On the other hand, afterthought clauses modified by *jóllehet* and *riktignok* do not weaken the speaker's commitment to whatever was said immediately before.

- (53) English original:

"Then why would you want to have lunch with him?"

"That's hard to explain," I said, *though* it may not be.

→

Norwegian translation:

"Men hvorfor ville du spise lunsj med ham da?"

"Det er vanskelig å forklare," sa jeg, *skjønt* kanskje ikke.

though maybe not

- (54) Hungarian translation (by I. Vaskó):

"De akkor miért szeretnél vele ebédelni?"

"Nehéz megmagyarázni," mondtam, *bár* nem is annyira.

though not either so.much

Due to the fact that *bár*, *though* and *skjønt* are not indicative concessives, they can introduce interrogatives as well as declaratives. Consider (55), whose Hungarian translation is (56).

- (55) He doesn't have so much money that he can buy the house ... *though* who knows?

- (56) Nincs annyi pénze, hogy megvegye a házat ... *bár* ki tudja?

The use of *bár*, or *habár*, is consistent with a communicated lack of speaker commitment to the truth of the concessive proposition. *Bár* and *habár* appear to share this lexical property with the Norwegian concessive connective *selv om*, which is literally "even if", but *selv om* is quite neutral with regard to the speaker's commitment.

In contrast, *jóllehet* and *riktignok* modify clauses whose proposition is endorsed by the speaker, that is, either presupposed or asserted to be true. *Jóllehet* would be impossible in (52), (54) and (56) and similar speech acts where a postposed concessive clause is intended to cast doubt on the felicity of the preceding speech act (what Sweetser, 1990, calls a speech-act concessive) or on the previously asserted truth of its propositional form. Analogously, *riktignok* may not replace *skjønt* when the speaker attempts to reduce the significance of what was said immediately before, not by flatly contradicting it but by suggesting that its purported relevance may have been exaggerated. As noted already, in

spite of the fact that the original meaning of *-lehet* is "may be", the Hungarian concessive *jóllehet* introduces a strictly indicative concessive clause. *Skjønt* is the only Norwegian concessive connective that can introduce a wh-interrogative. *Riktignok* and *jóllehet*, but also subordinating connectives like English *even though* and Norwegian *selv om*, require a declarative syntax. Except for *skjønt* and *bár/habár*, all concessives in interrogatives are anaphoric adverbial adjuncts like English *even so*, Norwegian *likevel*, or Hungarian *mégis/mégsem*.

The pragmatic analysis that we proposed for Norwegian (46), repeated here for convenience, is in fact not the only possible one:

- (46) Dressen koster 2000 kroner. *Riktignok* er den på salg.
 "The price of the suit is 2000 kroner. It is, *true enough*, on sale."

It could be that the speaker is reflecting on the price of the suit while producing the first utterance in (46) and finding it rather expensive, but then, in focussing on the fact that the price is supposed to be reduced because the suit is on sale, he concludes that maybe it is a good buy after all, because it would obviously have been more if it had not been on sale. This seems to be the only interpretation that works for the Hungarian translation of (46),¹³ with *jóllehet* as the correspondent of *riktignok*. Consider (57), in which a comment like the one put in parenthesis is optional: if it is left out, the communicator has evidently felt that the addressee should be able to arrive at an implicated conclusion corresponding to the meaning of *így még mindig megéri* ("so it is probably still worth it").

- (57) Az öltöny 2000 koronába kerül.
 the suit 2000 crowns costs
Jóllehet kiárusítás van (így még mindig megéri)
 well.enough sale is (so still always worth)
 "The price of the suit is 2000 kroner. ...
 It's on sale, *to be sure* (so it's probably still worth it)."

The parenthesized comment contains the concessive *még* ("still"), which betrays the speaker's feeling that it is an expensive suit. However, due to the appearance of *jóllehet* the speaker will succeed in communicating that it may be worth the price, even if the linguistic stuff in parenthesis is omitted. What looks like a universal quantifier that quantifies over temporal events, *mindig* (glossed as "always"), is here a non-truth-conditional procedural marker that presumably forms a lexical item together with concessive *még*. This is a grammaticalized item whose second element *mindig* is historically developed from the phonologically identical temporal quantifier meaning "always". *Még mindig* appears to weaken the speaker's epistemic commitment and to highlight the concessive relation between the explicated assumption that the suit is worth the price and the implicated assumption that the suit is very expensive.¹⁴

In the context of what was said previously about the pragmatic function of *riktignok*, we can now return to the Hungarian example (27), repeated here, and propose an

¹³ It makes sense that a Hungarian citizen checking the price tags on suits in a store in Norway would not conclude that 2000 kroner is reasonable, let alone a bargain ☺. But apart from the strictly pragmatic considerations that must play a role in the comprehension process there may in fact be a conventional usage difference between *riktignok* and *jóllehet* that accounts for the tendency to compute the meaning of Hungarian (57) in a way that differs from the pragmatically derived meaning of Norwegian (46).

¹⁴ In Norwegian, the non-truth-conditional middle-field particle *alltid*s (always + genitive *s*) plays a role similar to that of Hungarian *még mindig* in (57).

explanation for the pragmatic impact of *jóllehet* in the first conjunct and for the inferable relationship between the two conjuncts of (27).

- (27) *Jóllehet* megígértem neki, hogy adok kölcsön, *de* 1 millió koronát kér!
"I promised to lend him money, *it's true*, *but* he wants one million kroner!"

The first conjunct is the speaker's concession (**p**), which contrasts with an implicature derived on the basis of the explicit content of both conjuncts in (27) plus the procedural meanings of *jóllehet* and *de*, namely the implicated premise that the speaker never promised to lend him as much as one million kroner, so she is forced to either revoke her promise or settle with a compromise-sized loan. On analogy with what was said previously, the concession in the first conjunct of (27) is the strongest true proposition on a scale of propositions whose truth-conditionally weakest member is "I promised to lend that man something". That first conjunct does not specify any sum at all, so due to its vagueness it is regrettably consistent with a situation where the sum in question is the vast sum specified in the second conjunct. However, the entire stimulus of (27) makes it mutually manifest that the proposition of the *jóllehet* conjunct remains true only if the sum of money is reduced to something more modest.

4 Conclusion

The Norwegian concessive *riktignok* and the Hungarian concessive *jóllehet* exhibit some striking similarities in terms of their semantic meaning and pragmatic consequences, despite the fact that the two languages are totally unrelated from a genetic point of view.

A concessive discourse relation has two propositional members, **p** and **q**, which we have dubbed the concession and the counter-expectation, respectively. **p** may or may not contain discourse-given information, while **q** is always new information and moreover information that is supposed to carry more weight than the concession **p**. As **q** represents new information and therefore contributes relatively more to the relevance of the utterance than **p**, one might expect **q** to be always linguistically expressed. It is certainly true of the concessive constructions that have received the most attention in pragmatic studies and discourse studies that the counter-expectation segment is overtly expressed, no matter whether the concessive relation is signalled by syntactic subordination of **p** to **q** or by coordination of **p** and **q**. A construction in which both **p** and **q** are explicitly conveyed is clearly also the most common syntactic pattern in concessive constructions where Norwegian *riktignok* or Hungarian *jóllehet* modify **p**. The concession **p** and counter-expectation **q** are then conjoined by means of a connective corresponding to English *but*, in coordinative structures of the general type *riktignok p, men q* and *jóllehet p, de/mégis q*, respectively. What makes *riktignok* and *jóllehet* constructions so special, however, is that the more weighty assumption **q** can be communicated by way of an implicature. A speaker may first say something and then add a concession modified by *riktignok/jóllehet*, and there may be no ensuing connective *men* or *de* (alternatively *mégis*, "nevertheless") introducing a conjunct that should be related to the earlier concession and the speech act preceding it. Whenever *riktignok/jóllehet* appears in a discourse without a later connective *men* or *de/mégis* and therefore without a clause that represents the more salient member **q** of the concessive relation, the addressee has to identify and make a mental representation of **q** solely through an inferential process based on mutually manifest contextual assumptions. The richest and most accessible source of information about the strongly communicated implicature **q** is likely to be the utterance to which the concession marked

by *riktignok/jóllehet* was added. On our analysis that preceding utterance is not the one that expresses **q**, it only provides the addressee with contextual clues that are necessary for a successful pragmatic derivation of **q**. No other concessive in Norwegian or Hungarian encodes an instruction to the hearer to rely exclusively on inference, if need be, to retrieve the counter-expectation member of the concessive relation.

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